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COMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
The requirements of Rule 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and specifically Rule 49(4) through (10), were fully com-
plied with in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Appellee Charles 
H. Thronson, and in the interests of brevity and judicial economy, they 
are not repeated here, but rather are incorporated herein by reference. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
All supplemental statements of fact are included in the argu-
ments set forth below. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE PETITION OF APPELLEE CHARLES H. THRONSON IS IN 
FULL COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 46 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 
Ms. Thronson argues in her Brief in Opposition to Mr. Thron-
son's Petition for Writ of Certiorari (hereinafter referred to as 
"Brief in Opposition") that Mr. Thronson1s Petition allegedly is not in 
procedural compliance with the provisions of Rule 46 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Ms. Thronson1s argument is "supported" by (a) 
an incomplete reading of Rule 46, (b) a misapprehension of how and 
where Rule 46 is applied in light of the other Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, and (c) a misreading of Mr. Thronson's Petition. Ms. Thronson 
sets forth verbatim certain of the provisions of Rule 46 in her brief. 
(Brief in Opposition at 4-5). Curiously, however, Ms. Thronson's cita-
tion of this rule leaves out the entire second sentence, which reads as 
follows: "The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measur-
ing the Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons 
:hat will be considered:" [Emphasis added]. It is clear that Rule 46 
LS not jurisdictional, but is included to give counsel guidance as to 
/hat sort of factual and/or legal issues would be likely to result in 
:he granting of a writ of certiorari. 
Moreover, the Petition expressly sets forth those special and 
Important reasons why a writ of certiorari should be granted, in com-
pliance with Rule 46, in language taken directly from Rule 46(a), (b) 
and (c), and in the location in the Petition mandated by Rule 49(a)(9) 
Df the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See Petition at 4-5). The 
Petition makes it clear that the Court of Appeals' decision in the 
instant case is in direct conflict with not only all of the applicable 
prior decisions of the Court of Appeals, but also is in direct conflict 
with the applicable decisions of this Court. The Petition further 
makes it clear that the sua sponte determination of the Court of 
Appeals to award permanent alimony is a substantial departure from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. 
POINT II 
THE CASES FIRST CITED BY APPELLANT IN HER BRIEF IN 
FACT SUPPORT APPELLEE'S PETITION. 
The cases first cited in the Brief in Opposition actually add 
support to the Petition. For instance, much is made by Ms. Thronson of 
the permanent alimony award in Olson v. Olson. This Court gave the 
following description of the circumstances of Ms. Olson: 
Married soon after graduating from high 
school, . . . [Ms. Olson's] primary occupation dur-
ing the 20-odd year marriage, was caring for the 
parties' home and six children. Having worked only 
minor clerical jobs for two brief periods over 
twenty years apart, she has no reasonable expecta-
tion of obtaining employment two years hence that 
will enable her to support herself at a standard of 
living even approaching that which she had during 
the marriage. [Footnote omitted]. Continuing 
spousal maintenance is mandated by these 
circumstances. 
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 at 567 (Utah 1985). Ms. Olson doubtlessly 
meets the Jones/Rasband/Howell permanent alimony profile, discussed in 
detail in Mr. Thronson's Petition. 
In similar support of the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
Ms. Thronson's citation of Hiqley v. Hiqley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983), 
where this Court upheld the trial court's award of permanent alimony, 
2 
remanding the case for a redetermination of the amount of alimony. 
1
 The Brief in Opposition implies that Mr. Thronson's use of the term "profile" 
in the Petition is a fiction or "myth" created by Mr. Thronson. However, due credit 
for the use of the term "profile," and for the creation of this standard, should 
rightfully be given to the Utah Court of Appeals, which stated, in Howell v. Howell: 
Defendant [Ms. Howell] fits the profile described in 
. . . [Jones v. Jones] and other cases: she is approxi-
mately 50 years old, has minimal marketable job skills, and 
has spent most of the 30 plus years of the parties' marriage 
raising and caring for their five children in their home, 
presumably with the concurrence of . . . [Mr. Howell]. Her 
likelihood of achieving significant salary levels in the 
future is slim. 
155 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 at 21 (1991) [emphasis added]. 
2 This Court described the relevant facts of this case as follows: 
In the present case, . . . [Ms. Higley] has no present 
or prospective permanent income other than the $100 per month 
permanent alimony award, whereas her living expenses exceed 
$800 per month. She is a 47-year old woman in very poor 
health, who has spent most of the last 30 years of her life 
as a full-time homemaker and caretaker of five children. 
. . . It is highly unlikely that . . . [Ms. Higley] will be 
able to produce sufficient income for herself. She has no 
employment training or experience other than a few sporadic, 
seasonal, unskilled jobs. Given her health problems, it is 
questionable whether she will be able to obtain and maintain 
full-time employment. Even if she does find work, her earn-
ing potential is very low. . . . 
Id. at 380-381. 
le citation to Read v. Read. 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979) essentially is 
lapposite to the issue of transitional versus permanent alimony pre-
snted by the instant case. Finally, the Martinez decision likewise 
ivolves a case of little education, apparently minimal work experience 
ad a 17-year marriage—a situation this Court found similar to that in 
lson, supra. Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69, 74 (Utah App. 1988). 
In summary, none of the cases cited by Ms. Thronson support 
he decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case. Rather, the 
itations do just the opposite, supporting instead a grant of Mr. 
hronson's Petition. 
POINT III 
LENGTH OF MARRIAGE IS AN APPROPRIATE FACTOR WHEN 
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT TO AWARD PERMANENT 
ALIMONY. 
The Brief in Opposition is correct in observing that the 
>etition has placed importance upon, inter alia, the relatively brief 
luration of this marriage, along with the fact of Ms. Thronson's 
advanced academic degrees, professional licensure and continuous work 
experience. That is because length of marriage is a legitimate crite-
rion regarding the award of, and duration of, alimony. In Boyle v. 
Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987), the Court of Appeals discussed 
the criteria set forth in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), 
and this Court's utilization of those criteria in Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). The Court of Appeals in Boyle then stated: 
In Jones, the [Utah Supreme] Court examined 
the record for an analysis of the criteria, and 
considered, among other things, the length of the 
marriage and the recipient spouse's education and 
employabi1ity. The Jones analysis process made it 
clear that the three pronged criterion does not 
preclude considering factors such as the length of 
the marriage in awarding alimony. 
Id, at 671 [emphasis added]. The relatively short duration of the 
relationship in the instant case is an important criterion that was 
ignored by the Court of Appeals in its decision. However, to the 
extent the English decision may be in conflict, if at all, with the 
Boyle decision, that would merely provide an additional reason for this 
Court to grant the Petition. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition is in full compliance with all of the prerequi-
sites and considerations set forth in the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure. Further, the cases first cited by Ms. Thronson in her Brief in 
Opposition serve only to accentuate the error of the decision of the 
Court of Appeals in the instant case. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals either improperly failed to 
consider the short duration of the relationship between the parties 
here, militating against an award of permanent alimony, or there is a 
conflict between decisions of this Court and of the Court of Appeals. 
Both positions support a grant of this Petition. 
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner requests this Court to 
grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
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